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The Economic Consequences
of Reducing Military Spending
JILSEFORE THE CRISIS in the Middle East this
summer, the easing of international tensions
had reduced, for many, the urgency for the
United States to continue building or even main-
tain its military strength. As support for allo-
cating the nation’s resources to defense weak-
ened, people began to argue about the potential
for a significant “peace dividend” available to
the U.S. economy.’
How should the savings from reduced defense
spending be put to use to enhance our nation’s
welfare? Many analysts, concerned primarily
about the effects of large public deficits, have
argued that the savings should be applied to
reduce the government’s need to borrow.2
Others have voiced concern that a reduction in
defense expenditures will generate unemploy-
ment, at least temporarily, while resources are
reallocated to productive activities in the civilian
sector.3 Consequently, they have argued the in-
itial savings should be used to ease this adjust-
ment—perhaps by increasing expenditures on
training programs.4 Many other policy recom-
mendations have been made.
Although the current situation in the Middle
East raises doubt that there will be any signifi-
cant dividend in the near term, it does not de-
tract from the relevance of such recommenda-
tions. Instead, it provides us with more time to
evaluate the various options associated with
future defense cuts.
In reviewing the economic implications of
reduced military spending, this article examines
some issues that have been overlooked by those
in search of ways to use the “peace dividend.”
The article begins with a brief analysis of re-
cent trends and the prospects for future cuts in
military spending to see how large a dividend
might be. Some simple economic principles are
then employed to assess how the peace dividend,
regardless of its actual magnitude, might be used
to achieve diverse economic goals.
‘For example, see Pennar and Mandel (1989).
2See, for example, Schultze (1990).
3For example, see “Peace Dividend or Recession?” (1990).
Also see Pennar and Mandel (1989), who report the results
of a study of the short- and long-term effects of reducing
the defense budget by 5 percent a year in real terms from
1991 to 1994 and keeping it constant thereafter. Although
this study predicts enhanced economic growth in the long
run, it also predicts some short-term losses. Also see Ellis
and Schine (1990), who report the results of a study in-
dicating that as many as 1 million defense-related jobs (or
20 percent of all jobs in defense-related activities) could be
lost by 1995. Although other analysts have argued that the
employment losses could be insignificant (see, for exam-
ple, Uchitelle (1990)), some defense contractors have
already begun to cut production and employment.
4See, for example, the bill proposed recently by Senator
PeIl (S.2097).Table 1
Trends in U.S. Defense Spending in the
Past 50 Years
Total defense spending’
Decade Nominal Real Share of GNP
1940s $ 35.8 5285.5 18.3°’o
1950s 402 187.0 10.1
1960s 59.2 216.4 8.4
1970s 90.3 200.0 58
1980s 238.3 274.4 6 I
‘Billions of dollarsaveraged over the decade. Tho real figures
are in 1989 dollars.
To place the discussion of the economic im-
plications of reduced defense needs into perspec-
tive, it is helpful to examine recent patterns of
military spending. Table 1 shows three very dif-
ferent perspectives of U.S. military spending
over the past 50 years. We can see that nominal
military spending in the United States has grown
considerably since the 1940s, rising from an
average of $35.8 billion per year during the
decade that included World War II to an
average of nearly $240 billion per year during
the 1980s. After adjusting for inflation,
however, we see a somewhat different picture.
Real military spending declined sharply im-
mediately after the WWII decade; and, its pat-
tern since the 1950s has been more erratic,
with its net rise by the 1980s being considerably
less dramatic than suggested by the nominal
figures. Finally, as the table shows, military
spending as a fraction of gross national product
(GNP) has fallen markedly over the past five
decades. Its share in the 1980s was only one-
third of that in the 1940s.
While military spending might now represent
a fairly small proportion of GNP, it is still an im-
portant component of economic activity. Defense
spending was $301.1 billion in 1989—more than
$1200 per person in the United States.~This
number suggests that there could be a consider-
able dividend from a large-scale disarmament.
Even without the Middle East crisis, however,
the military spending cuts likely to have occurred
in the near future would have been quite small
relative to the whole economy. In a recent study,
for example, the U.S. Congressional Budget Of-
fice (1990) estimated the effects of a proposal
by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO) for limiting conventional forces in
Europe.°It found that the treaty would
generate an annual savings of about $3 billion in
1990 prices. Although $3 billion seems large, it
constitutes less than 1 percent of the total
Defense Department’s budget authority for
fiscal year 1990 and less than .06 percent of
1989 GNP. This amounts to less than $13 per
year per U.S. citizen.
This estimated savings from the prospective
reduction in military spending pales in compari-
son to earlier U.S. disarmament efforts follow-
ing wartime periods.~After World War II, for
example, defense spending fell by about $57.3
billion from 1945 to 1946, almost 27 percent of
GNP in 1945. From 1953 to 1954, after the Kore-
an War, defense spending fell by $7.4 billion,
almost 2 percent of GNP in 1953.
Forecasts of the actual size of future defense
cuts, of course, are subject to much uncertain-
ty. The budget proposed by President Bush in
January 1990 for fiscal year 1991 called for
reducing the defense budget by 2 percent after
5During the Reagan Administration’s military build up,
defense spending grew at a 5.0 percent annual rate after
adjusting for inflation; in comparison, the annual growth
rate in real GNP over this same period was only 3 per-
cent. Earlier this century, before WWI, military spending’s
share of GNP was less than 1.5 percent. (Because data on
military spending before the 1940s are not entirely consis-
tent with the data presented in table 1, they are not shown
here.)
6NATO’s proposal then called for a reduction of its own and
the Warsaw Pact’s ground capabilities in Europe and for a
reduction in their tactical aircraft capabilities that would
leave an advantage for NATO. (Ground capability is mea-
sured by army units intended to fight on ground. Tactical
aircraft capabilities are measured by fighters and bombers
intended to fight in the air and on the ground using con-
ventional weapons.) It called for a2 7percent reduction in
a selection of NATO weapons. Assuming an equally pro-
portionate reduction by all NATO members, this require-
ment implies that the U.S. would have had to remove and
destroy 600 tanks, 122 armored personnel carriers, 112
pieces of artillery, 189 helicopters and 105 aircrafts from
Europe. Furthermore, about 30,000 U.S. troops would
have had to be withdrawn from Europe and demobilized.
7As noted below, however, the economic implications of a
given reduction in military spending depend quantitatively
on whether the reduction follows a war or occurs during a
relatively peaceful period.adjusting for inflation over the fiscal years 1991
to 1995.~Others argued for defense spending
cuts as much as 5 percent in real terms per
year from fiscal years 1992 to 1994, achieving
an annual savings of about $60 billion (in 1989
prices) starting in 1994.~If cuts of this magni-
tude were implemented, the implied savings
would constitute about 1.2 percent of GNP for
the year 1989, nearly $250 per year on a per
capita basis.
And the savings could be even larger. Indeed,
on the day of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait,
President Bush announced that, although the in-
vasion indicates a need to maintain a strong
military force, U.S. armed forces could be
reduced by 25 percent over five years given the
recent changes in Soviet-U.S. relations.’°
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Generally speaking, the trade-off between
competing uses of resources implies that a re-
duction in real military spending would provide
a “dividend” in the form of increased real private
and public consumption and investment oppor-
tunities—that is, increased resources available
for the production of consumption and invest-
ment goods. To quantify these increased oppor-
tunities over time, the annual peace dividend is
defined here simply as the annual reduction in
real military spending.”
Figure 1 illustrates this trade-off given the na-
tion’s resource and technology constraints by
means of a hypothetical production possibility
curve (PPC) for defense goods (national security)
and nondefense goods (public and private in-
vestment and consumption). This curve depicts
the maximum quantities of defense goods (M)
and nondefense goods (N) that can be produced
simultaneously for given amounts of capital and
labor inputs.
Figure 1
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Assuming that resources are fully utilized, the
economy is always operating on the frontier
regardless of the level of military spending. If
no resources were allocated to the production
of defense goods, for example, the total output
of nondefense goods would be shown as N,.
Producing defense goods thus requires sacrific-
ing the production of some goods for invest-
ment and consumption. The opportunity cost of
providing a specific level of national security,
for example, MA, is the value of the lost produc-
tion of nondefense goods, NA — N,. Conversely, if
the economy were originally operating at point
A, cutting military spending out entirely would
imply increased production of nondefense goods,
NA — N,. Thus, with a reduction in military spend-
ing (say MB—MA), the annual dividend would im-
ply increased opportunities for the production
of nondefense goods (NB—NA). The shaded insert
on pages 50 and 51 contains a discussion of the
welfare implications of increased opportunities
for investment and consumption afforded by a
reduction in military spending.
8”Peace Dividend or Peace Recession?” (1990).
9”The Peace Economy” (1989).
‘°Dowd(1990). Specifically, the Pentagon plan then called
for cutting the armed forces by 500,000 troops from the
current level of 2.1 million. But, without a clear resolution
of the ongoing conflict in the Middle East, any reduction in
military spending might seem optimistic.
liThis definition envisions the dividend as a flow—i.e., as
the term is normally understood. Thus, a permanent cut of
X dollars in real terms per year implies an X dollar divi-
dend each year indefinitely into the future. Using a present
discounted value concept, these flows over time can be
translated into a stock concept: Xlr, where r is the cons-
tant real interest rate.
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The concave shape of the PPC reflects dimin-
ishing marginal returns in productive transfor-
mation. That is, the amount of nondefense
goods that must be sacrificed to produce one
more defense good increases as M increases.
For example, in the figure, the move from C to
A and the move from A to B involve identical
reductions in military spending. Starting at the
point with a higher level of military spending
(Me), however, that reduction in military spend-
ing implies greater additional production of non-
defense goods than when starting at point B.
(That is, NA — N~ >N0
— NA.) Hence, assuming
resources are fully employed, a given reduction
in the production of defense goods when the
current level is low—for example, during
peacetime—would imply smaller additions to
consumption and investment opportunities than
when the current level is high—for example,
during wartime.
These allocative effects of the peace dividend
can also have implications for the amount of
resources available for production in general.
Specifically, any additional investment adds to
the future resource base, thereby enhancing
future output growth and investment and con-
sumption opportunities. Hence, even if the de-
cline in military spending were temporary, for
example lasting only one year, its benefits in
terms of increased productive capacity could be
realized over many years. This longer-term ef-
fect can be modeled in the framework presented
above by an outward shift of the PPC curve
over time.”
Some analysts believe that, in recent decades,
military spending has been excessive, reducing
the residual supply of productive resources (that
is, capital and labor) available for private and
nondefense public investment and thereby weak-
ening the economy.’3 According to this “deple-
tion” theory, the effects of higher levels of
military spending are reflected in lower rates of
investment and, consequently, lower rates of
economic growth. Thus, the principal result of
reduced military spending would be greater in-
vestment and economic growth.
Evidence on the “crowding-out” effect of
military spending is based primarily on empirical
analyses relating changes in military spending’s
share of GNP to the GNP shares of other broad
categories of expenditures; typically, the studies
focus on the effect on private investment’s
l2Of course, one might argue that the level of military spen-
ding could positively influence the position of the PPC.
Because military spending enhances a nation’s ability to
protect its resources, it might serve to increase the na-
tion’s future resource base by encouraging more
investment.
“See, for example, Dumas (1987), Melman (1988) and Du
Boff (1989). In contrast, Weidenbaum (1990) argues that,
as defense spending has fallen relative to GNP, the effects
of such spending on the U.S. economy have become less
significant.tures, not just real private domestic investment.
Table 2
Broad Categories of Real Expenditures
as a Share of Real GNP’
Decade C I X Gnm Gm
1940s 547% 12.1°/n 05% 101% 23.0%
1950s 58.4 16.5 0.1 11.8 13.2
1960s 59.5 167 -0.4 14.3 10.3
1970s 62.2 172 -0.7 14.9 6.2
1980s 645 16.9 —1.2 13.6 6.2
1Each category is converted into real terms using its im-
plicit price deflator. Separate price deflators were used for
federal government spending and state and local government
spending, but both defense and non-defense federal expen-
dilures were deflated by the same number
share of GNP.’4 Table 2 shows the trends in
personal consumption expenditures (C), private
domestic investment (I), nondefense public ex-
penditures (Gnm) on goods and services, defense
expenditures (Gm) and exports net of imports (X)
as shares of GNP over the past 50 years. To
focus on the rea/ effects of military spending,
each broad category of spending is converted
into real terms by dividing it by its own price
deflator and by real GNP.’°
As the table suggests, real military spending
has crowded out all categories of real expendi-
As real military spending’s share fell from the
1940s to the 1980s by 16.8 percentage points,
real consumption’s share rose by nearly 10 per-
centage points. Real private investment’s share
and real nondefense public spending’s share
also rose over this period, though less dramati-
cally.16 Of course, in a broad sense, the substitu-
tion observed between nondefense and defense
public expenditures is consistent with the
crowding-out notion; in this case, public invest-
ment on the nation’s infrastructure—that is,
highways, airports, mass transit, water
systems—was crowded out.”
To be sure, the size of the peace dividend, as
defined here, is independent of its allocation
among the production of private and public
consumption and investment goods. But its
longer-term implications depend on that alloca-
tion. The best or “socially optimal” reallocation
of resources among investment and current con-
sumption depends on the nation’s willingness to
forego current consumption in order to invest
and thereby enhance future consumption possi-
bilities. The greater this willingness, the more
likely the resources from a reduction in military
spending will be devoted to additional invest-
ment rather than additional current consump-
tion. The lower the nation’s willingness to
forego current consumption to enhance future
consumption, the lower will be the proportion
l4See Gold (1990) for an extensive survey of this evidence.
Also see Adams and Gold (1987) and U.S. Congressional
Budget Office (1983). It should be noted that identifying
the degree to which military spending has resulted in
lower expenditures on other goods and services and lower
economic growth is difficult. The problem lies in determin-
ing how investment and other expenditures would have
behaved if military spending had been different—in an ex-
treme case, if it had been zero. Because reduced-form
parameters relating defense expenditures to other expen-
ditures would not be independent of the policy regime,
estimates of these parameters might provide little informa-
tion on how a permanent change in military spending (i.e.,
a policy regime change) would influence other expen-
ditures. In addition, it is important to note that, if higher
military expenditures result in higher levels of GNP, lower
shares of investment, for example, need not imply a
crowding-out effect of military spending.
ISA comparison of tables 1 and 2 reveals that real military
spending as a fraction of real GNP was higher than
nominal military spending as a fraction of nominal GNP
from the 1940s to the 1970s, but slightly lower during the
1980s. This divergence reflects the difference between the
general price level of defense goods and that of all goods
and services. The price level for defense goods, on
average, was lower than the general price level between
the 1940s and the 1970s, but higher during the 1980s.
The focus on real military spending here is intended to
emphasize the importance of its real allocative effects.
Failure to account for relative price movements masks
these effects.
‘6Smith (1977) finds that the crowding-out effect of military’s
share of income on investment’s share of income is nearly
one to one for 14 OECD nations during the 1960s. How-
ever, Boulding (1973), Edelstein (1989) and Aschauer
(1989a) argue that this effect is not empirically relevant for
the United States. Also see Browne (1989), who questions
the validity of the argument that military research and de-
velopment has crowded out civilian spending on research
and development by “depleting” our nation’s scientists
and engineers. As is well-known, military R&D has pro-
duced important innovations that have been applied suc-
cessfully to production activities in the civilian sector; one
commonly cited example is the computer. In addition,
Browne argues that this crowding-out effect on R&D pre-
sumes that the supply of scientists and engineers is fixed.
A greater demand for highly skilled labor, however, has in-
fluenced its supply, although with the usual lag.
hAs an annual average of GNP, net public infrastructure in-
vestment fell from approximately 2.3 percent in 1960-66 to
about 0.8 percent in 1980-85 (Du Boff (1989), p. 7, table
2). Aschauer (1989b) argues that the recent reduction in
public capital, including infrastructure, might be responsi-
ble for the recent decline in productivity.of the savings that is allocated to investment.
Thus, in contrast to the suggestion of the deple-
tion theory briefly described above, the divi-
dend from reduced military spending need not
result in significantly greater rates of invest-
ment and economic growth. The extent to
which the dividend will affect economic growth
depends on how it is allocated among the pro-
duction of investment and consumption goods.
.‘
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In recent decades, decreases in nominal
military spending typically have been associated
with increases in other public expenditures in
nominal terms. Indeed, after falling to 19.5 per-
cent in the 1950s from 25.1 percent during the
1940s, total public spending (federal plus state
and local) on goods and services has remained
roughly constant as a fraction of nominal GNP,
around 20 percent; only the composition of
those expenditures changed. Although there
could be reasons why this pattern might persist
in the upcoming decades, many analysts have
questioned whether a continuation of this pat-
tern is either likely or even desirable. Never-
theless, the basic question to be addressed
should be couched in real terms: What should
be done with the peace dividend?
ii~ crease NOntheiènse Public
Expenditures
Some analysts have argued that leaving
nondefense public expenditures alone and using
the reduction in military spending to either
decrease the deficit or lower taxes is not the
best use of the peace dividend. Instead, many of
them believe that at least part of the savings
from arms reduction might best be used to in-
crease nonmilitary government spending—
specifically, to rebuild the nation’s infrastruc-
ture.18 In terms of the economic framework
above, this policy would shift out the PPC, in-
creasing future production and consumption
opportunities.
Others have argued that, unless the fall in
military spending is somehow offset, resource
utilization and, hence, economic activity will fall
as well.19 In this view, which lies within the
standard “Keynesian” paradigm, the government
should use part (or all) of the savings to finance
additional public expenditures, including nonin-
frastructure expenditures, such as welfare pro-
grams, to offset the negative effect of reduced
military spending on aggregate demand.
This argument assumes that military spending
in particular or public expenditures in general
enhance social welfare not only by providing
additional public goods, but by increasing
employment and thereby stimulating the econo-
my—that is, by inducing the use of idle resources.
It implies that, without the increases in military
spending or, more generally, public expenditures
during the post-WWII period, the economy
would have operated below its potential output
capability (that is, inside its PPC).
Although there is evidence that a permanent
decrease in military spending can produce a
permanent decline in aggregate output,’°the
decline in output could be generated, in part,
by a voluntary reduction in the supply of labor.
In other words, this evidence does not necessari-
ly imply that a permanent decline in military
demand, without an increase in other public
spending, would cause these productive re-
sources to become involuntarily idle on a per-
manent basis.
Reduce Taxes
Some analysts would like us to consider an
alternative policy that leaves other government
expenditures unchanged and uses the dividend
to reduce taxes. By increasing individuals’ after-
tax income, this policy might induce individuals
to decrease their supply of labor, which would
in turn decrease output without leaving labor
resources involuntarily idle.2’
‘°Forexample, see Du Boff (1989) and Melman (1988).
19For example, see Bolton (1966), especially pp. 37-41.
205ee Barro (1981). In studying the output effects of govern-
ment expenditures in the United States, he distinguishes
permanent from temporary components of military spen-
ding. He finds that the effect of increases in temporary
military spending (essentially wartime expenditures) on
output was nearly one-for-one; increases in permanent
military spending also increased output, but by less than
the change in military spending.
21See Barro (1981) for a theoretic discussion of the effects
of government expenditures on output. In support of this
line of reasoning, Dunne and Smith (1990) find that for the
United States, military spending does not “cause”
unemployment. Riddell (1988) argues, in a more Marxian
spirit, that the government’s apparent bias for military over
non-military expenditures is driven by its objective to main-
tain international order so as to maximize the profitability
of U.S. capital. This possible endogeneity of military spen-
ding calls many empirical analyses that treat military spen-
ding as exogenous into question. Also see Garfinkel
(1990a), who uses a game-theoretic model to show how
military spending can be driven by aggregate economic
activity through the government’s motive to prevent other
nations from extracting its citizens’ resources.
NOVEMBER/DECEMBER 1990It should be noted that a permanent decline
in measured output, triggered by the impact of
reduced military spending (and reduced taxes)
on leisure, does not necessarily reflect a deterio-
ration in social welfare. Because leisure has
value, welfare could increase even if consump-
tion did not. Further, the theory described
above suggests that, although individuals would
work less, they might actually consume more
nondefense private goods because their
disposable income has increased (their tax
liabilities have declined). On net, their welfare
would have increased as long as this new out-
come were chosen voluntarily.”
Some analysts, who view large public deficits
as harmful to the economy, have argued that
the government should use the peace savings to
reduce the public deficit.” In particular, the
large deficits (public dissavings) of the past
decade are thought to have caused a decline in
total national savings—that is, the sum of
private and public savings. Since a decline in
total savings decreases the residual supply of
credit available to private borrowers, large
public deficits are considered by many to have
pushed up expected real interest rates (interest
rates adjusted for expected inflation).’~Thus,
using the dividend to reduce the public deficit
would decrease expected real interest rates and
thereby stimulate both investment activity and
the production of goods, such as exports and
new homes, whose sales are sensitive to
movements in interest rates.
Although the U.S. savings rate appears to
have declined in recent years, how much of this
decline can be blamed on large public deficits is
unclear.” The argument that public deficits in-
fluence the national savings rate is based on a
number of potentially questionable assumptions.
One is that individuals do not view tax cuts that
increase public borrowing (holding the level of
government spending constant) as increasing
their future tax liabilities. Instead, individuals
feel wealthier and increase their consumption in
response to such tax cuts. Although they also
might respond by increasing their savings, the
increase in private savings is assumed to be in-
sufficient to keep total savings from falling. In
this view, for a given level of government ex-
penditures, public deficits decrease total savings
and increase aggregate demand.26
Other analysts argue that individuals believe
reductions in current taxes associated with addi-
tions to public debt must be financed eventually
with additional future taxes. In light of the in-
crease in their future tax liabilities, individuals
increase their savings. Conversely, they respond
to a decrease in the public deficit, for a given
level of government expenditures, by decreasing
their savings. In either case, consumption is
unaffected.
In this view, often referred to as the “Ricar-
dian” view, individuals behave as if a decrease
in the public deficit results in an equal decrease
in the present discounted value of their future
tax liabilities. This argument builds on the
assumption that public debt will be retired
eventually out of future taxes. If this view is
valid, private and public savings for a given
level of government expenditures should be
perfectly negatively correlated, while total sav-
ings should be unrelated to public savings.’7
22As discussed below, however, labor and capital resources
could be left involuntarily idle temporarily as the economy
adjusts to the reduced military demand.
23See, for example, Schultze (1990). Also, see Chrystal and
Thornton (1988) for a related discussion of the effects of
deficit spending. 24lndeed, this effect on interest rates is thought to be the
mechanism through which military spending has crowded-
out investment. By enhancing the productivity of private
capital, however, military spending could have had a
“crowding-in” effect that would have offset its crowding-
out effect. But Aschauer (1989a,b) presents evidence that
does not support the notion that additions to the stock of
military capital add to the productivity of private capital.
Moreover, the references cited in footnotes 14 and 16 pro-
vide evidence that military spending does not crowd out
private investment.
‘5Schultze (1990) estimates that national savings as a
percentage of national income (i.e., net national product)
has fallen from an average of 8 percent during the three
decades before 1980 to 3.3 percent during the first three
quarters of 1989. Some analysts, however, question the
notion that savings is too low in the United States; their
skepticism is based on problems with the conventional
measurements of savings. Cullison (1990) provides a
useful survey of this literature.
26See Thornton (1990) for a theoretical discussion of the link
between total national savings and public deficits.
“Against this Ricardian view, one might argue that deficits
could be financed either through increased seigniorage or
income taxes in future generations. In either case, the
“burden” of the current deficit could be shifted and
budget deficits, holding government expenditures fixed,
could affect economic activity. See Barro (1989) for a brief
discussion of the empirical evidence on the effects of
budget deficits. While recognizing the problems associated
with testing the Ricardian proposition, Barro argues that
the existing evidence lends more support to the Ricardian
view than to the alternative view (p. 52).DO
To be sure, using part of the annual dividend
to reduce the public deficit could increase total
investment and total consumption. According to
the Ricardian view, however, the amounts of
these increases do not depend on whether taxes
are cut or the deficit is reduced. A cut in the
deficit reduces future tax liabilities, but the tim-
ing of the tax cuts does not matter.
Because of the distorting nature of the income
tax system, however, the equivalence between
taxes and debt creation implied by the Ricardian
view would be, at best, a rough approximation.
Economic theory predicts that proportional in-
come taxation distorts individuals’ decisions
about consumption and labor supply. These
distortions are costly and, other things being
equal, the severity of the distortion increases as
the tax rate increases. Consequently, if the
federal government wants to minimize the costs
associated with these distortions, given the path
of future government expenditures, it should
smooth income taxes over time.28 This modified
version of the Ricardian view suggests that tax
reductions, rather than deficit reductions,




In thinking about how the savings from re-
duced military spending could be used, it is im-
portant to consider how the economy adjusts to
unanticipated changes in resource uses. Reduced
military spending will produce a negative short-
run effect on production, as labor and capital
resources are shifted from military to civilian
uses. During the transition period, some re-
sources will be unemployed or underemployed.
Previous disarmaments have been associated
with sizable reductions in economic activity.~°
From the first quarter of 1945 to the first quar-
ter of 1946 (peak to trough), for example,
nominal GNP fell at a seasonally adjusted an-
nualized rate of $22.8 billion or 10.3 percent.
These numbers understate the magnitude of the
decline in output as, during this period, there
was a considerable acceleration in inflation.” In
real terms, GNP fell 18 percent over this period,
and it was not until the third quarter of 1952
that the level of real GNP had fully recovered.
Although this decline in real GNP is large, it is
an overstatement of the drop in national wel-
fare. While the level of employment fell sub-
stantially, the unemployment rate rose very little -
Instead, a substantial number of workers, partic-
ularly women, voluntarily withdrew from the
labor force.
The transition to peacetime after WWII was
facilitated, in part, by government policies. Tax
reductions and transfer payments (unemploy-
ment and veteran benefits) left disposable (net
of taxes) income nearly unaffected by the mas-
sive reduction in military spending. Thus, de-
mand for consumption goods rose to offset par-
tially the decline in military demand.
The sharp decline in military spending that
followed the end of the Korean War was asso-
ciated with a mild recession. From the second
quarter of 1953 to the second quarter of 1954
(peak to trough), real GNP fell 3.2 percent. De-
clines in defense spending and other federal
government expenditures, combined with inven-
tory decumulations, were the driving forces
here. By the first quarter of 1955, however, real
GNP had climbed well above its previous peak.
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The aggregate adjustment cost for any reduc-
tion in military spending can be measured by
the real value of resources (labor and capital)
left idle involuntarily during the transition. For
a given cut in defense spending, the magnitude
28See Barro (1979). Also see Garfinkel (199Gb) for an exten-
sion of this theory to include conscription as an additional
tool for financing public expenditures to avoid the distor-
tions of income taxes, particularly during periods of severe
military needs.
“In this view, deficits are necessary to smooth out the
distortionary effects associated with taxes. Hence, a tem-
porary increase in government spending should be financed
with debt and a temporary decrease in government spend-
ing should result in a budget surplus; this tax-smoothing
view of debt creation predicts that deficits are temporary
phenomena. Although historical evidence supports this
positive theory of debt creation—see Barro (1979), for
example—it is unclear whether the current deficit is only a
temporary phenomenon. Indeed, the magnitude and per-
sistence of the peacetime deficits during the 1980s are un-
precedented in U.S. history.
‘°SeeBolton (1966) and references cited therein for a more
detailed examination of these periods of disarmament.
Much of the discussion here draws from this work. Data
are taken from Balke and Gordon (1986).
3hThis acceleration was driven, in part, by the removal of
price controls in 1946.of these costs depends on the speed with which
labor and capital resources can be transformed
to meet new demands.
The speed of resource transformation, in turn,
depends on the degree of specialization of
resources used in the military sector. This spe-
cialization has two dimensions. First, certain in-
dustries, occupations and firms are highly de-
pendent on military demand. Second, military
production is highly concentrated in several
regions of the United States. Such specialization
will slow the adjustment process.
A given reduction in military demand now
might generate relatively greater adjustment
costs than those associated with large-scale dis-
armaments following wartime periods. During
wartime periods, resources normally used to
produce nondefense goods are mobilized quick-
ly and, presumably, on a temporary basis; after
the war, resources are rechanneled easily into
their original civilian productive activities. In
contrast, during peacetime defense firms and
their employees expect that demand for their
product is essentially permanent. To the extent
that these firms and employees have a compara-
tive advantage in the production of defense
goods, they are less likely either to diversify
their operations into civilian markets or be able
to do so in the event of an unanticipated perma-
nent reduction in military spending.”
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To evaluate society’s options for using the sav-
ings from reduced military spending, we must
address two related economic issues. ‘I’he first
issue, already discussed, concerns what are the
best uses of the dividend or the new “highest-
valued” uses of the resources previously used in
the military (presumably their previous highest-
valued uses). The second issue concerns how to
rechannel resources efficiently from their mili-
tary uses to their new highest-valued uses.
Some people have advocated establishing public
programs—for example, training programs—to
lessen the costs of adjustment borne solely by
those closely linked to the military sector. A bill
introduced recently by Senator Pell (S.2097), for
example, seeks to establish a program through
which grants would be made to assist state and
local governments in developing economic ad-
justment plans—for example, job retraining and
finding alternative uses for defense facilities.
These grants would be funded, in part, from the
savings from reduced military spending.” Anoth-
er bill introduced by Senator Coats (S.2682) is
intended to aid defense contractors in diversify-
ing their operations into nondefense markets.
Through tax incentives, this bill would encourage
defense contractors and their employees to adopt
employee stock ownership plans (ESOPs) to fi-
nance the corporate restructuring necessary to
adjust to the reduction in military demand.
These programs are aimed at distributing the
adjustment costs and the benefits of reduced
military spending equitably; however, they are
unlikely to effect an efficient reallocation of
resources.’4 Consider, for example, a program
that increases public nondefense expenditures
on goods that are most easily produced by the
capital and labor resources originally employed
for the production of defense goods. While this
program might well limit the adverse impact of
reduced military spending otherwise borne by
those firms and individuals highly dependent on
military demand, it is clearly inefficient from
the nation’s point of view. Unless increased
spending on these other goods were deemed
desirable on a permanent basis, this policy
would not provide firms and individuals with
the incentives to channel their resources to new
higher-valued uses. Instead, it would merely
prolong the process of adjustment and delay the
realization of the full benefits from a perma-
nent reduction in military spending.
Nevertheless, the redistributive effects of
reduced military spending should not be
“In contrast, one might believe that defense contractors,
having learned from past experience with sharp declines
in military demand, would have diversified their operations
to exploit commercial opportunities. While such diversifica-
tion would provide insurance against large losses to these
firms and their employees in the event of an unexpected
decline in military demand, past efforts in this direction
have not been particularly successful. See Weidenbaum
(1973) and Ellis and Schine (1990).
their firms unless a contract has been canceled. The
states of Washington and California already have initiated
adjustment plans. See Ellis and Schine (1990).
‘4Although the evidence on the effectiveness of manpower
programs (for example, the Manpower Development and
Training Act) is mixed, some studies find that manpower
policies have been successful in raising the earnings of
training program participants. See, for example,
Ashenfelter (1978).
“Representative Boxer’s proposal (HR5327) is similar;
however, it would penalize defense contractors who closedismissed as unimportant or irrelevant in choos-
ing how the peace dividend ultimately will be
used. The question of who reaps the gains and
who bears the costs of an unanticipated reduc-
tion in military spending is an important aspect
of the problem and will play an important role
in the solution.
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This article has examined some possible ef-
fects of a permanent reduction in military spen-
ding. In principle, the present discounted value
of the implied dividends from such a reduction,
in terms of increased consumption and invest-
ment opportunities, could be substantial.
Through increased private and public invest-
ment, reduced military spending implies greater
economic growth and, hence, greater consump-
tion and investment opportunities in the future.
The important economic questions are, How can
these resources be reallocated efficiently to non-
military uses? and, How can we identify what
these uses should be? This article has introduc-
ed and discussed the economic issues that must
be addressed in answering these questions;
much further analysis and discussion will clear-
ly be needed before these questions can be
answered adequately.
Of course, given the recent course of events
in the Middle East, the reduction in military
spending in the near future might not be large
enough to generate any sizable dividend. Thus,
debate over whether the savings from reduced
military spending should be used to reduce the
public deficit, redistributed to taxpayers
through tax cuts or be used to rebuild the in-
frastructure might seem premature. Because
many communities, firms and individuals are af-
fected by even small reductions in military
spending, however, the “micro” costs of these
adjustments will not be ignored in the political
decision-making process.
But temporary transitional costs do not justify
abandoning the effort to reduce the amount of
resources allocated to military spending. More-
over, the Middle East situation is not a perma-
nent obstacle to realize a large dividend in the
future. While cuts in defense spending are not
expected to be particularly large now, a resolu-
tion of the Middle East conflict will permit a
much larger dividend in the future.
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